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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF CASE 
This appeal is from the judicial decisions of the Court 
entered by the Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen, Disrict Judge, 
denying defendants1 claims for trial and determination of the 
claimed public need and necessity, the right for the jury to 
determine the fair market value of underlying mineral rights in 
the property, the right to present evidence of the fair market 
value of access permits for hunting rights, the right for assess-
ment of attorneys' fees and costs for abandonment of claims, and 
the proper taxing of costs, and therefore, an appeal from the 
special jury verdict which was based upon those judicial deci-
sions in the case of Cornish Town v. Evan 0. Roller and Marlene 
B. Roller, Civil No. 25058, First Judicial District Court, Cache 
County, State of Utah. This Court has jurisdiction of this 
appeal under Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2(3)(i) (1987). Rule 
3(a). 
THE NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This action is a condemnation proceeding in which the 
town of Cornish sought to acquire approximately 100 acres of 
defendants1 property in fee simple and approximately 7 acres of 
defendants1 property in esements for rights-of-way and access to 
the springs. The property was acquired as alleged protection 
zones above the Griffiths and Pearsons Springs which are located 
on defendants1 property. Defendants appeal from decisions made 
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by the Court which materially and substantially affected the 
issues submitted to the Jury for Special Verdict. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The issues presented on appeal include whether defen-
dants have a right to a trial and determination of (1) the issues 
of public need and necessity, (2) the issues of the fair market 
value of the underlying mineral interests, (3) the issues of the 
right to produce evidence of the fair market value of access per-
mits for hunting rights, (4) the issues of an award of appropri-
ate costs and attorneys1 fees for the plaintiff's abandonment of 
claims, and (5) the issues for award of claimed costs of trial. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT STATUTORY AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The relevant statutory and constitutional provisions on 
appeal are: 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-4. This Section states: 
78-34-4. Conditions precedent to taking. 
Before property can be taken it must appear: 
(1) That the use to which it is to be 
applied is a use authorized by law; 
(2) That the taking is necessary to such 
use;. . . 
(Emphasis added) 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-9 (1987). This Section 
states: 
78-34-9. Occupancy of premises pending action -
Deposit paid into court - Procedure for payment of 
compensation. 
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The plaintiff may move the court or a judge 
thereof, at any time after the commencement of 
suit, on notice to the defendant, if he is a resi-
dent of the state, or has appeared by attorney in 
the action, otherwise by serving a notice directed 
to him on the clerk of the court, for an order 
permitting the plaintiff to occupy the premises 
sought to be condemned pending the action, includ-
ing appeal, and to do such work thereon as may be 
required. . . . 
3. Utah Code Ann. S 78-34-2. This Section 
states: 
78-34-2. Estates and rights that may be taken. 
The following is a classification of the 
estates and rights in lands subject to be taken 
for public use; 
(1) A fee simple, when taken for public 
buildings or grounds or for permanent buildings, 
for reservoirs and dams and permanent flooding 
occasioned thereby, or for an outlet for a flow, 
or a place for the deposit of debris or tailings 
of a mine, mill, smelter or other place for the 
reduction of ores, or for solar evaporation ponds 
and other facilities for the recovery of minerals 
in solution; provided that where surface ground is 
underlaid with minerals, coal or other deposits 
sufficiently valuable to justify extraction, only 
a perpetual easement may be taken over the surface 
ground for such deposits. 
(2) An easement, when taken for any other 
use. 
(3) The right of entry upon, and occupation 
of lands, with the right to take therefrom such 
earth, gravel, stones, trees and timber as may be 
necessary for some public use. 
(Emphasis added) 
4. Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-10 (1987). This Sec-
tion states: 
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78-34-10. Compensation and damages - How 
assessed. 
The court, jury or referee must hear such 
legal evidence as may be offered by any of the 
parties to the proceedings, and thereupon must 
ascertain and assess: 
(1) The value of the property sought to be 
condemned and all improvements thereon appertain-
ing to the realty, and of each and every separate 
estate or interest therein; and if it consists of 
different parcels, the value of each parcel and of 
each estate or interest therein shall be sepa-
rately assessed, 
(2) If the property sought to be condemned 
constitutes only a part of a larger parcel, the 
damages which will accrue to the portion not 
sought to be condemned by reason of its severance 
from the portion sought to be condemned and the 
construction of the improvement in the manner pro-
posed by the plaintiff. 
(3) If the property, though no part thereof 
is taken, will be damaged by the construction of 
the proposed improvement, the amount of such dam-
ages. . . . 
(Emphasis added) 
5. Utah Code Ann. S 78-34-16 (1987). This Sec-
tion states: 
78-34-16. Occupancy of premises pending action -
Substitution of bond for deposit paid into court -
Abandonment of action by condemner. 
In the event that no order is entered by the 
court permitting payment of said deposit on 
account of the just compensation to be awarded in 
the proceeding within thirty (30) days following 
its deposit, the court may, on application of the 
condemning authority, permit the substitution f a 
bond in such amount and with such sureties as 
shall be determined and approved by the court. 
Condemner, whether a public or private body, may, 
at any time prior to final payment of compensation 
and damages awarded the defendant by the court or 
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juryf abandon the proceedings and cause the action 
to be dismissed, without prejudice, provided, how-
ever, that as a condition of dismissal condemner 
first compensate condemnee for all damages he has 
sustained and also reimburse him in full for all 
reasonable and necessary expenses actually 
incurred by condemnee because of the filing of the 
action by condemner, including attorney's fees. 
(Emphasis added) 
6. Utah Constitution, Art. I, S 7. This consti-
tutional provision states in relevant part: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property without due process of law. 
7. Utah Constitution, Art. I, § 22. This consti-
tutional provision states in relevant part: 
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for 
public use without just compensation. 
8. Town of Cornish Ordinances 81-1 (R. 431), 
83-1 (R. 435), 85-1 (R. 441). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action is a proceeding in condemnation by 
Cornish Town to condemn approximately 100 acres of defen-
dants1 property for the purpose of creating protection zones 
above two springs located on defendants' property and to 
provide rights-of-way and access to the springs. 
I. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BEFORE THE LOWER 
COURT. 
The Town of Cornish filed this action in July, 1986, 
seeking to condemn defendants' property in fee simple (Ordinance 
-5-
85.4, Tr. at 1) through the statutory power of eminent domain, 
the property taken surrounds two springs in which both parties 
hereto have an interest. In its complaint (R. at 1), the Town of 
Cornish claimed a right to obtain defendants1 property in fee 
simple. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint sought the same fee simple 
interests. (R. at 344) Defendants1 Answer and Ninth Affirmative 
Defense and defendants1 Third Cause of Action in Counterclaim 
allege the value of the land and consequential damages to the 
taking are valuable rights in the land that plaintiff sought to 
condemn. (R. at 31) The Town of Cornish filed a Motion for Imme-
diate Occupancy of the property on July 29, 1986. (R. at 11) On 
October 8, 1986, following three days of hearing during which the 
plaintiff put on evidence of of a public need and necessity, the 
trial court refused to consider any evidence of defendants 
refutinging the prima facia claim of public need and necessity 
and entered an Order of Immediate Occupancy on December 16, 1986. 
(R. at 137) The Order of Occupancy contained no legal descrip-
tions of the rights-of-way acquired and two subsequent motions to 
amend Complaint and a first amended complaint provided descrip-
tions of the property to be acquired through eminent domain. The 
Order for Immediate Occupancy also included the claim of the 
plaintiff for the taking of the property in fee simple. Defen-
dants objected to the Order as to the taking in fee simple. (R. 
at 69) In the proceedings for immediate occupancy, the specific 
question was asked if the plaintiff demanded fee simple including 
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all oil rights, and the response was that the purposes for which 
the property was condemned would be frustrated if the plaintiff 
could not obtain fee simple to the property including all mineral 
rights thereto. (R. at 469-470) 
Thereafter, defendants filed a Motion for Partial Sum-
mary Judgment (R. at 416) to determine that the date of taking of 
property condemned was September, 1981 at the time the town ordi-
nance 81-1 (R. 431) was enacted. That motion was denied. (R. at 
579) Defendants prepared their defense and burden of proof of 
their claim of greater value for trial based upon the Complaint 
and Order of Immediate Occupancy in which plaintiff demanded and 
was exercising its claimed right to take the property in fee sim-
ple. (Tr. Vol. 1 at 15) 
In presentation of plaintiff's case, the Trial Court 
made preliminary orders prior to the opening statements of the 
parties which prohibited defendants from putting on evidence 
refuting the claims of public need and necessity; and prohibited 
defendants from putting on any evidence concerning the fair mar-
ket value of the mineral rights underlying the property taken. 
Defendants1 offer of proof as to mineral rights (R. at 591) and 
R. at 602 and Tr. Vol. 1 at 15 and Vol. 11 at 10) During trial, 
the Court prohibited defendants from putting on evidence as to 
the fair market value of access permits for hunting; after trial 
the Court denied defendants1 claim for attorney's fees and costs 
appropriate when plaintiff abandoned its claim for fee simple and 
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refused to allow defendants1 claim to tax appropriate costs 
incurred in this proceeding. 
The jury was instructed to make its findings without 
any consideration for the above referenced matters, and therefore 
the jury special verdict was inappropriate and incomplete. 
Final Judgment on special jury verdict and a taking of 
perpetual easements and rights-of-way was entered by the District 
Court on May 13, 1988 (R. at 131) and Amended Final Judgment was 
entered June 13, 1988 (R. at 494). 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff brought this action in condemnation pursuant 
to Statutory Power of Eminent Domain, claiming a public need and 
necessity to acquire lands belonging to the Defendants in fee 
simple for public use for the following purposes: 
(1) Additional access easements to two separate 
springs situated on defendants1 property in which plaintiff has a 
partial interest and to which plaintiff has had access easement 
since the inception of the town's interests in the springs. 
(2) Sites for reservoirs and chlorinators. 
(3) Extensive protection zones above each spring 
including approximately 50 acres of land in each protective zone. 
(R. at 1) 
Defendants contested plaintiff's claim of public need 
and necessity for the acquisition of the land for the protection 
zones and contested issues relative to fair market value of the 
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property and the damages to be paid to the defendants for the 
property taken in condemnation. (R. at 31) 
Upon filing Complaint, plaintiff filed a Motion for an 
Order of Immediate Occupancy. (R. at 11) At the hearing held 
October 8-12f 1986, the defendants raised the issues of whether 
or not the claimed public use was authorized by law, whether the 
taking was necessary to the use, whether the total of the land 
taken was necessary or should have included substantially more 
property, and whether the taking required a taking of title in 
fee simple, which included the claimed taking of all mineral 
rights to the property. 
The evidence, as presented by Cornish Town, to these 
issues was (1) the town needed the protection zones to control 
nitrates in the water; (2) the town had received an opinion that 
nitrates in Cornish1 water supply were there by reason of agri-
cultural fertilization. (Hearing Tr. at 13 & 14). The town 
admitted that the report was the only source of information 
relied upon by the town and that the town had conducted no inde-
pendent tests. (Hearing Tr. at 32) 
The Department of Health for the State of Utah, by let-
ter to Cornish Town advised the town that these springs used by 
Cornish for culinary water "may be relatively shallow sources of 
water and it may be impossible to develop them" (Exh. 2), yet the 
town admitted that there was no necessity to make additional 
tests to determine whether the springs could be made into a 
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culinary water systems (Tr. at 49). The town did not have, at 
the time of the hearing nor at the time of trial, any state 
approval of their plans for the construction of new water collec-
tion lines. (Hearing Tr. at 49 and at 109). During the course 
of the testimony, defendants raised issues of a public need and 
necessity to take fee simple title to a protection zones above 
the two springs when there was no showing that the source of the 
nitrates was the defendants1 fertilization program (Hearing Tr. 
at 37), or, that control of a 1500 feet radius of property above 
the springs by the city would reduce the nitrates in the water 
(Hearing Tr. at 36). 
There is no State requirement that a 1500 feet radius 
above the spring need be taken as a protection zone (Hearing Tr. 
at 36). The City Engineer estimated that only 1,090 feet need to 
be taken (R. at 775 & Hearing Tr. at 82). The amount of land to 
be taken was arbitrarily increased by the Mayor, not as a public 
necessity, but rather the Mayor stated the additional acreage was 
to "accommodate" Mr. Roller. (Hearing Tr. at 93). 
Defendants raised the issues of public necessity of 
spending public funds, as it was arbitrary and a waste of public 
funds to purchase protection zones where there was no evidence 
that the acquisition of the protection zones would affect the 
nitrate content of the water. (Hearing Tr. at 72 and following). 
Defendants challenged the issue of the public necessity 
to take the property in fee simple title. Cornish admitted that 
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the town had entered into an agreement with an adjoining land-
owner, who owned property within the 1500 foot radius above the 
Griffiths spring, (Exhibit 14) where the town executed a 20-year 
agreement in which the land owner agreed not to fertilize his 
property. This agreement was acceptable to the town (Hearing Tr. 
at ) and the State of Utah (Hearing Tr. at 129), yet the town 
sought to take fee simple title to defendants' property without 
ever offering to defendants such an arrangement. 
At the conclusion of the plaintiff's testimony, defen-
dants moved to dismiss upon the following grounds: (1) the town 
did not show with any degree of certainty that it had a public 
need and necessity for the protection zones; (2) There was no 
showing of public necessity to take fee simple title to the land 
for nitrates; (3) The size of the zone was increased arbitrarily 
from 1,090 radius feet above the spring to 1,500 feet radius; and 
(4) The town failed to show any public need for the property 
taken when other alternative sites with substantially greater 
potential to develop water for the town were available. The 
Trial Court denied the motion stating: 
"As to the site and the amount included in the 
site is not for the courts to decide. That's for 
the condemnor to decide as long as they act rea-
sonably and in good faith." (Hearing Tr. at 981) 
Defendants proceeded to introduce evidence to the Court concern-
ing the lack of necessity and good faith: 
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(1) The State has not determined the amount of land 
necessary to protect this water supply (Hearing Tr. at 110) nor 
whether the water claimed by Cornish is ground water or surface 
water (surface water requires a greater treatment, and, there-
fore, greater expenditure of public funds). (Hearing Tr. at 128) 
(2) The nitrate level in the Cornish water made rede-
velopment of the springs a questionable investment. (Hearing Tr. 
at 150). 
(3) Cornish should have the area examined in an 
attempt to determine the recharge area of the springs so that the 
areas could be controlled (Hearing Tr. at 157), and a decision 
made as to how much land for a protection zone was necessary. 
(Hearing Tr. at 166). 
(4) The soils were poor aquifers (Hearing Tr. at 29) 
subject to contamination from the surface (Hearing Tr. at 210), 
the probable source of nitrates was agriculture (Hearing Tr. at 
211), but that additional tests had to be made in order to deter-
mine the source of the nitrates in the water supply. (Hearing 
Tr. at 212). 
(5) The source of the nitrates in the water would have 
to be determined in order to designate the amount of the land 
necessary to provide protection to the springs. (Hearing Tr. at 
214). 
(6) No evidence was provided to show that the condem-
nation of the approximate 50 acres above each spring was going to 
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reduce the nitrates in the soil, nor reduce the nitrates in the 
springs. (Hearing Tr. at 250). 
(7) Core samples were drilled and dye tests conducted 
in the area sought to be condemned. It was determined the 
recharge area for the Griffiths Spring is 200 acres and the 
recharge area for the Pearson Spring is 650 acres. (Hearing Tr. 
at 328). 
(8) Dye tests determine that the source of the Cornish 
water was in fact surface water. (Hearing Tr. at 334). Dye 
placed outside of the protection zones indicated that the area 
sought to be condemned was not the only recharge area of the 
springs. The recharge area of the springs could not be reduced 
into a smaller area from the 200 acres for Griffiths Spring and 
650 acres for Pearson Springs. (Hearing Tr. at 350) 
(9) The major source of water flowing into the Pearson 
Spring was from snow drifts outside of the area condemned by Cor-
nish and that only a very small quantity of water originated 
within the protection zone, and, therefore, Cornish1 attempt to 
condemn lands did not encompass the point of origination of the 
water, nor the point of origination of the claimed contamination. 
(Hearing Tr. at 369) 
(10) The nitrogen in the soil is fixed by algae. The 
amount of nitrogen added to the soil by the algae is more than 
twice the amount applied in fertilizer. The amount of fertilizer 
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put on the land by defendants was less than the total that the 
crop consumed. (Hearing Tr. at 373) 
(11) Letting the land lay dormant will not cause a 
reduction in nitrates, and, therefore, the taking of the land by 
Cornish in protection zones will not result in upgrading the 
city's water supply (Hearing Tr. at 378). 
(12) If the condemnation proceeds and the town takes 
the land out of production, nitrate levels will not decrease as 
the soil is a large reservoir of potential nitrates from natural 
organic sources. (Hearing Tr. at 408). 
Defendants offered Cornish the use of pre-existing 
roads to the springs in lieu of the condemnation proceedings on 
farmland. (Tr. 248). Cornish rejected the offer and condemned 
farmland for new roads. Defendants testified that if the city 
did not need to take fee title to the land, defendant offered to 
withhold portions of his land from fertilization. (Hearing Tr. 
at 266) . 
Following the conclusion of the evidence the Trial 
Court indicated in its decision as follows: 
This court is not to inquire into the use or necessity 
or expediency or the appropriateness of the particular 
property, and the court quotes that as a quote of case 
and re-quotes it again in the Fuller case. 
They have also stated in the Fuller case that in view 
of the general grant of authority carries no limitation 
by implication. In either case the necessity is for 
the condemnor and is not for the courts to decide, and 
the decision of the condemnor is final as long as it 
acts reasonably and in good faith. (Hearing Tr. at 482) 
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The Trial Court denied all of the defendants1 motions 
and requests. In doing so, the Court abrogated its duty in stat-
ing that: 
They have reviewed and selected this method and I do 
not find from the evidence that they acted unreasonably 
or that they acted in bad faith in doing so. I don't 
pass on their judgment as to its appropriateness 
because that is not within the prerogative of this 
court to do so. (Hearing Tr. at 484) 
After the commencement of the trial and the selection 
of the jury had been completed and before opening statements were 
made by the parties, defendants made proffers of proof to the 
Court that they intended to request that the jury make a determi-
nation of the fair market value of the underlying minerals of the 
property. (Tr. Vol. 1 at 1) The minerals are zeolite, that has 
an immediate market value. In addition, there was a ready market 
for the mineral (Tr. Vol. 1 at 17), and that defendants had pre-
pared a portion of their case with extensive legal costs and the 
preparation of expert witnesses to present testimony as to the 
fair market value of the underlying minerals. Defendants made 
proffer that the minerals could not be extracted without removal 
of the overburden, being the surface soil. (Tr. Vol. 1 at 8) 
Plaintiff then moved to amend their complaint to abandon their 
claim for a taking of the fee simple interest to the property and 
to make claim for a perpetual easement only. (Tr. Vol. 1 at 7) 
The Court granted the motion to amend complaint and denied 
defendants1 rights to put on evidence as to the fair market value 
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of the underlying mineral interest. (Tr. Vol. 1 at 15) The Court 
stated: "I don't see any of us will in our lifetime ever see any 
bulldozer or anything out there . . . I'll believe it when I see 
it." (Tr. Vol. Ill at 10) Without considering any evidence, the 
Court indicated that the basis for its ruling was its own opnion 
that there was no mineral value in defendants1 property. That 
decision forced defendants to carry the burden of proof as to 
claimed interests for perpetual easements that were never raised 
until the date of trial. 
Defendants then petitioned that the Court hear evidence 
as to the claims of public need and necessity of the property 
being condemned. (Tr. Vol. 1 at 10) The Court denied that motion 
saying that all issues as to public need and necessity were pre-
sented by the plaintiff in a prima facie case, and that the Court 
had no right to determine whether there was a public need and 
necessity, and therefore denied defendants1 request for any find-
ings or determination of the issues of public need and necessity. 
(Tr. Vol. 1 at 10) 
During the trial, defendants attempted to put on evi-
dence as to the fair market value of the retail cost of access 
permits for hunting purposes for the deer herd that exists on 
defendants1 property. The Court denied defendants the right to 
put on that evidence, stating that since defendants had not sold 
any hunting access permits prior to the date of taking, they 
could not claim that hunting access permits would increase the 
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the tdir marke- "- s 
claimed, frpr
 :* OL- / 
The .V-y awarded Judgment- r^ Special Verdict of $59,670 
( -.*.;. udgi i tei it 
Subsequent * *r ;. defendants petitioned the Court 
iur an ":v-^-j • * -uses diniii I i cists I m I In dbrim Inn -
ment ^? •. r.e -J*.H.-. ^y
 b..i. . *: tee simple interest to the 
property, THp attorneys' fees and costs were incurred i n prepar-
• .r»- ... - .... value of 1:1 le mil leral interests 
in the p r o p e r ^ * :>: Court denied those clai ms. (R. at 859) 
SUMMARY IF AHt,,.Mh:^ 
The issues of public need and necessity f:*r tht ..--
at ion of protective zones by f a ^ n q defe nda r^s' land through ton-
:^"M .. . • ..-—.. j • . j - -e jury as part of 
tne proceedings at trial,-" 
value ^ - .»* properly *^ - • ^  :<.. * * , regulatory ^ H -
ing by Ordinance 81-1 when the town prohibited any farming or use 
->: a r. e Rwo^; Commri,
 L • t • u c i vj f 
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of the property within a two-mile radius of the town's water 
supply.-
From the commencement of this action, the town intended 
to claim fee simple title to the property which included a claim 
for mineral rights. The mineral interests in the property cannot 
be mined without removal of the soil overburden. Removal of the 
mineral interests would not support the surface right. The 
defendants have a right to the fair market value of the mineral 
3/ 
rights condemned by the town.-
The town was granted leave to amend its complaint to 
abandon its claim for fee simple title to the property and to 
claim a perpetual easement to the property. The abandonment and 
dismissal of that claim gives rise to an award to defendants of 
all attorney's fees, expenses and costs incurred in preparing 
their claims for greater value of the claims for condemnation of 
fee simple interests which included the mineral rights to the 
land.-7 
The value of access permits for hunting of the deer 
herd on defendants' property was proper evidence of the value of 
2/ Nollan v. California Coastal Commn., 97 L.Ed.2d 677 (U.S. 
Sup. Ct. June, 1987) and First English Evangelical Lutheran 
Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 96 L.Ed.2d 250 (U.S. 
Sup.Ct. June, 1987) 
2/ Wm. E. Russell Coal Co. v. Board of County Commissioners of 
Boulder County, 270 P.2d 772 (Colo., 1954) 
i/ Merced Irrigation Dist. v. Woolstenhulme, 483 P.2d 1 (Cal., 
1971). 
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 6 ~ 
awarded ' ••• defendants the costs oi transcripts ana •.-it- co>.^ of 
extraordinary exhibits as required in a condemnation 
6/ 
proceeding,.-' . . 
ARGUMENT 
I 
WHETHER THE COURT ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION OF THE 
LAW WITH REGARD TO THE ISSUE OF PUBLIC NEED AND DETER-
MINATION OF NECESSITY. 
1 Th P sf > .. - v / 
ssues • . :'i s , t ne reviewing cour* shoul: 
defendants as :o issues ot public neeo di"j necessity since 
decision of -"*- * • tai ^uii *ao nidde m lae mature ot a ^ a n ^ n g 
of summary judgmei it. 
B. With regards < he issues of fact-, this Court: 
defendants Sm^t . .*-.. .. refused o ... .i^ .uc. jetc-.aants' 
evidence in determining public need and necessity. 
^y S t a t e by ai id th^QUi j > ^ * MJJJ .SS_, J .
 m i rKi j ^ ^ r . *J.7 
( U t a h , 1 9 7 2 ) . 
-
7 l
' i'amp ton ^ Wi l s u n
 (l I i I'" , / < I / / 1 I 1 c » H 1 1 1 
The standard is whether, reviewing the record as a 
whole and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of defen-
dants, is plaintiff entitled to a judgment of public need and 
necessity as a matter of law. National American Life Ins. Co. v. 
Bayou Country Club, Inc., 403 P.2d 26 (Utah, 1965). 
The Trial Court abrogated its responsibility in a con-
demnation proceeding when it stated that the court would not sub-
stitute its judgment for that of the town as to the determination 
of public need and necessity. The town had reviewed and selected 
the method chosen for the improvement of its water supply and the 
court did not find from the plaintiff's evidence that they acted 
unreasonably, in bad faith or arbitrarily. 
2. A determination at law of public need and 
necessity. 
Two Utah cases are particularly pertinent to these 
issues. The first is Salt Lake County v. Ramoselli, 567 P.2d 182 
(Utah 1977) where this Court said as follows: 
The power of eminent domain is not to be exercised 
thoughtlessly or arbitrarily and the courts possess 
full authority to determine the proper limit of the 
power to prevent abuses in its exercise and litigants 
should and do have great latitude in conferring the 
positive functions upon the court as they clearly did 
in this instance. The question of necessity of the 
taking is the functional perrogative of the judicial 
system and that principle of law is stated in Nichols 
on eminent domain. 
In every case, therefore, there is a judicial question 
whether the taking is of such a nature that it is or 
may be founded on public necessity. 
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The second is the case of Utah State Road Commission v. 
Friberq et a.3 ., 687 P.2d 82] U It , ih 1 91 M) wher e thi s Coi lr t - M O : 
We turn fi rst to the issue of the legal effect of the • • 
order of immediate occupancy. In a condemnation pro-
ceeding the state has the burden of coming forth with 
the evidence of, and the burden or persuasion to estab-
lish his right to condemn. The state must prove that 
the taking of the property is necessary and that the 
property will be dedicated to a public use. (With 
citations) . 
ln
 Exi^exg the State contended that the ri ght to con. -
d emnwasfixFfjv. >• » > -
 :«11 i a t e :: • c c u p a i I :::) i s e i 11 e r e d , 
The Supreme M.^ U > < 3 1 U < 
i t t he condemnor * s author i i ^  t..-. - >noemr; , ^  cha 1 *. ^ M C M - -
prima facia showing of the right M O :ondemn must c> 
made to support and order of immediately occupancy, 
However, a prima facia showing of thp ^\^hnr\t-
a find! determination of authority. 
An ordn- ,M ..'<m e^ . . ji.e ^.. ipancy is an order entered 
pendente lite and only authorizes the state to take 
immedlate possession unt i1 a f lna 1 adjudication of the 
me r i t <* 
The State's right to condemn if challenged can finally 
be determined only after a trial on the merits - -. a 
hearina on the moMon for immediate ocnm^nrv, 
e Ramose^ 11 case, supra, tl le T'r-rM Court stated as 
follows: 
At the conclusioi i of tl le trial the Court made its find-
ings which generally stated that any use of the prem-
ises was uncertain indefinite, speculative and not 
within the reasonably foreseeable future. Based 
thereon it concluded that the plaintiff had failed i i i 
its burden of proving need or public necessity and that 
the attempted condemnation \ •• tear abusive 
discretion, 
jeiendants contend that the trial court refused to con-
sider there has never been a determination made by the State of 
Utah that the springs were ground water or surface water. The 
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size of the protection zone necessary to meet the supposed needs 
of the town was never determined based on the town's claims that 
the protection zones were necessary to control nitrates. 
Finally, the Court did not determine whether the taking of fee 
simple title was necessary. 
The Trial Court abrogated its function as a court when 
it said as follows: 
The degree of necessity or the extent to which the 
property will advance the public purpose the courts 
have nothing to do with. That is not the role of the 
court. When the use is public the necessity or expedi-
ency of the appropriation of the particular property is 
not subject of judicial cognizance. 
This Court is not to inquire into the use or necessity 
or expediency or the appropriateness of particular 
property and the court quotes that as a court of a case 
and re-quotes it again in the Fuller case. (Tr. at 
454). 
And further, 
That there is sufficient testimony to show the neces-
sity of something being done by Cornish to do something 
to their water supply so they can meet the requirements 
of the state as far as adequate and pure water supply. 
(Tr. at 460) 
The court granted the order of immediate occupancy in violation 
of the law as set forth in State v. Friberg, supra, page 832 
where the court held that the State must prove that the taking of 
that the property is necessary and the property will be dedicated 
to public use. In Ramoselli, supra, page 143, the court held 
that the question of necessity of the taking is a functional pre-
rogative of the judicial system. In Williams v. Hyrum Gibbons & 
Sons Co., 602 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah, 1979), the court held: 
The duty of determining the necessity of a proposed 
taking, the necessity must be established by evidence 
or the proceeding fails. Necessity does not signify 
impossibility of constructing the improvement for which 
the power has been granted without the taking of the 
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demninq authority, thp order v4; sf.a:d. * .5 *!*>*'. as 1 a the 
better, they are sayirig pLaintifi ;;dn* ot . • * •. • e taking *.* 
benef - •' *«rause thpre was no anowrq tr-^ Kie jv,dence 
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.--.llate Occupancy indicated that Coniib i --m: .-a 'e approved 
P 1 a n S a n d '" r O • * '• * • ^ -I *- « - - ^
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tern (Hear 
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required, (He<ir iiiq 1 a' .. »• * he springs wtitr ^iuu> a «d <^r 
then the issue of the size ui u**v. protection zone io accomplish 
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the purpose of protecting the water supply would have to be 
determined. (Hearing Tr. at 214) 
The flow of the springs was unknown by Cornish after 
the development, and, therefore, the economic expenditure versus 
the public good was unknown by Cornish. It was submitted by 
defendants throughout the entire hearing that these expenditures 
of the money were not in the best interest of the public, taking 
into consideration the costs of acquisition of the land. (Hear-
ing Tr. at 101). The Trial Court's finding that there was suffi-
cient testimony to show the necessity of something being done by 
Cornish, to do something to their water supply simply shows the 
court's inability to articulate a necessity to do a specific act 
to achieve a specific public purpose. 
That criteria fails to meet the criteria established by 
the Supreme Court in the case of Ramoselli, supra, where the 
Trail Court reviewed the law as cited before herein and stated: 
Briefly stated the evidence at trial was that no 
defined plans had been adopted or approved, that no 
time frame of use within the reasonably foreseeable 
future had been determined, despite the fact that a 
voluntary acquisition of nearby property for public use 
some six years prior had not as yet been placed to its 
intended purpose, and that no funds had been requested, 
budgeted, appropriated or were presently in existence 
to place the property in question to use. 
The plaintiff's failures to determine whether or not 
the water in question is surface or ground water, what treatment 
will be necessary and the cost of that treatment, the flows which 
will be anticipated from the improved springs areas versus the 
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iuxxv. parallel Salt Lake counties efforts In the .-. 
Ramos ei^ + x.a^.e, 
•"he "!r a i «.'• -f abrogated its r~]p and function as a 
i ijui'i u ^ p r e before J: - r'^ ^ K 
pu b l i c need a. i - e c e s s i t \ , .*av.
 (q therefore r a i s e ; - - -
n e c e s s i t y , d e ' ^ n d a r + s ' e v i d e n c e amply p r o v e d that there * i ^ 
fact necesi* . - 'nud-
tion c: t.ne .^sues set. forth herein. 
11 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW DEFENDANTS 
TO ASSERT THE DEFENSE AND INTRODUCE TESTIMONY AS TO THE 
CLAIM OF PUBLIC NEED AND NECESSITY AT THE TIME OF 
TRIAL• 
!' -- held in Utah State Road Commission v. 
Friberq, suprd, thai; 
AI. order <.»f immediate occupancy .s -nt^red pendent 
light and uOiy authorizes state to > ake immediate p-..^  
session : • ,. * ~il adiudicat i^r ( ^ ^ TUP r its? 
The Trial Court errei . id,,. »q t< ^-..oni.. , .t . ssue of 
. - ' uiie iridi ui uiie rudtter. As stale J in 
the Friberq v.di»f <*i
 t *-, > - ^ ? 
The State s right to cond*- ,. if challenged, car 
finally be determined only after a trial on the me; L-.^ . 
not at a up.;rin° ^^ +'h^ m.-^-inn for :. rnrr.pd i at e occupancy. 
State Road Commn. v. Denver and Rio Grande Rdilroou, 1 
2 36, ": ' ' p '- 'Vt 
Ti"itr C o u r t i :, : .*• , 
Friebergs1 express reservation ' ;:heir riqhi to "ontest eh-1 
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power to condemn in the plenary proceedings is not prohibited by 
the rules of res adjudicata. Just as the right was reserved by 
the Friebergsf defendants in the instant case reserve the right. 
(Tr. Vol. 1 at 10 and at 91-98) where the issue of necessity was 
specifically raised by the defendants. Defendants were denied 
the right to put the issue before the jury and made an offer of 
proof to the court relative to such issues. (Tr. Vol. 1 at 92). 
The only issue submitted by the Court to the jury was the issue 
of the value of the property taken. 
Defendants were entitled to have the jury hear evidence 
and determine the issue of public need and necessity as such 
issues related to the question of good faith, waste of public 
funds, public need and necessity, abuse of discretion and use of 
the premises for uncertain indefinite and speculative reasons, 
and to determine the size of protective zones and the problems 
with the determination that the springs are surface water or 
ground water. 
Ill 
WHETHER PLAINTIFF IS LIABLE FOR TAKING OF DEFENDANTS1 
PROPERTY BY RESTRICTIVE ORDINANCE. 
Defendants have profitably dry farmed their property. 
For many years, applying herbicides, pesticides and fertilizers 
to their property to obtain maximum yields from their farming 
practices. 
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On July 29, 1986, plaintiff served upon defendants a 
Summons and Complaint pursuant to powers of eminent domain, con-
demning in fee simple approximately 100 acres of defendants1 
property for a protective zone above the springs which were 
sources of part of the town's water supply and for access roads 
thereto. 
On August 1, 1987, plaintiff postponed the enforcement 
of Ordinance No. 85-1, ostensibly for the reason that the condem-
nation proceeding was pending and resolution of this action would 
give plaintiff the right to impose or abandon the ordinance. 
In June, 1988, plaintiff passed Ordinance 88-1, repeal-
ing Ordinance 85-1, "in its entirety." 
In each of the ordinances described above, defendants 
were restricted from using fertilizers, pesticides, and herbi-
cides on their property, from keeping or grazing livestock on 
their property, and from using their property for human habita-
tion. If defendants were prohibited from the right to use herbi-
cides and pesticides on their soil, it becomes infested with 
weeds and cannot be used to cultivate crops. Without the right 
for application of fertilizers, the property quickly becomes 
depleted and will not yield a profitable crop. The only remain-
ing beneficial use of the property would be grazing of livestock, 
and the ordinance prohibited that use. Plaintiff has been pro-
hibited by those ordinances from all beneficial or economically 
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v i a b l e ^ o r d i n a n c e s have m a t e r i a l I T 
- d e c r e a s e d t h e v a l u e 01 -
 ;,>iopert. ; . . ^ • -*.- - , ^ o l . 
I . " UNDER STATE LA- i NANCE K - l E N T I T L E S DEFENDANTS 
TO COMPENSATION A- F THE DATE > -'M^CTMENT. 
;-• • * - i v ^ s s m e r v r. oantdiges f o r j u s t com-
p e n s a t i o n in H. ' .neni aonia;n j . : . -« J ,< .. ^  .•»;.-* •= • »• .- * 
sp< :.*r»- ' ' ^ i n . i . < Ut ah Code A - w . . 
d a t e -.-I t a k i n g 4 - - e f f e c t i v e d a t e „>i i e 
r e s t r i c t i v e o r d i n a n c e , De.nq Sept ejjiL/t. , , - r l -
A. To vaxue defendants' Properry on the Date Process 
Was Served Is to Deny Just Compensation. 
3f< 4 - r<it Utah Code Ann, 
S 7 8 - 3 4 - 1 1 - ' c r e a t e s * ' e t i u U a t i ^ preium^ fo r 
i
*-
f
.^-i- , 7 ' ,a¥\f^^ s ^ . ' h** t h e d a t e .r s e : v i c e : u i ' u - e ^ s , 
Utah State Road Lonmi^sio:: ._ ._  ±jL±j^±: * - Ci ' " "> -^ar , 
198' ,T, a^* - resumpt JL :>:; J-• rebutted "by a sho*^.^ ...... 
ai 
awar-j tridt # ,. : not p iuv i a t j . ^ s t compei 
Id. at ojfc. 
2/ Sectior 
When right co damages deemed to have accrued. F 
purpose of assessing compensation and damages, ; 
right thereto shall be deemed to have accrued at the 
date of the service of summons, and its actual value dL 
that date shall be the measure of compensation for all 
property to be actually taken, and the basis of damages 
to property not actually taken, but injuriously 
affected, in all cases where such damages arc -, 
as orovided ^ ' r>e next prPc^Mrm section. 
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In Friberqy process was served seven years before the 
state proceeded to a final decree. In the intervening years, the 
Friberg property appreciated in value. The Supreme Court held 
that the Fribergs would not be justly compensated by valuing 
their property as of the date of service because "the difference 
in valuation of defendants1 property between the date of service 
of summons and the date when the right to condemn was settled is 
evident and significant." j[d. at 835. 
The Friberg case establishes a two-pronged test to 
rebut the presumption that damages accrue at service of summons: 
(1) the unfairness of valuing the property at service of process 
must be evident, and (2) the difference in value must not be 
insignificant. Ld. at 831. 
B. It Is Unfair for the Plaintiff to Value the Roller 
Property at a Date When the Property Has Lost All 
Value by Reason of the Plaintiff's Restrictive 
Ordinances. 
In this case, as in Friberg, the landowner can only be 
justly compensated if his property is valued on the actual date 
of taking rather than on the date of service of process. On Sep-
tember 24, 1981, the plaintiff's Ordinance 81-1 precluded any 
reasonable use of the Rollers' property and caused a complete 
loss of value. The plaintiff first devalued the Rollers' prop-
erty by regulatory restrictions and then five years later com-
menced this legal action. The appraisers testified and by affi-
davit testified that the value of the property in 1981 was 
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Value Constitutes a Compensable Takingt 
*.. • ;Lah vJ.onst \ < ur ion provides that 
private property shall nut ue • u^en or da J- - - ise 
v • IM J .*• "uensat . ' " Stockdale v. Rio Grande Western 
Ry. Co«,, 28 bidh . ne Utan Supreme 
('*, -ri i uied t nat 
'* a / substantia * * ;iter teren,. e *i.th private property 
wr:, ch destroys or materially Lessens its value, or by 
which the owner's right to its use and enjoyment is in 
any substantial degree abridged or destroyed, is, 
fact and in law, a taking, in the constitutional sense, 
to the extent of the damages suffered, even though the 
title and possession of the ownpr remain undisturbed." 
The r-ourr required the defendant rd±iroac si j^Ja , c 
to otticiaii - ; mdowner's property before if :oi-i ; 
subject the property L-J a proposes > :;* r ^ . ", - - ^e 
i i;u~ , <- - >" >oSo and annov him wi^f smone ana u n d e ; r hp 
Towr Ordina^ .. • - * ^ VG!U'J •••• destroys 
the • ''l^rs "iqht to use dr.u enioy 1 ne. proper*. ^  r 
r . ' •
 l
 ** >ed for many years, 
D, Threatened Public uaiudgg __•£_i1 r
 :vdt_e_ f u^oe r : y 
Is Compensable, 
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In State Road Commn. v. District Court, 78 P.2d 502 
(Utah 1938), the State Road Commission was about to build a via-
duct that would deprive the landowner of convenient access to his 
property. The proposed viaduct would also darken the street in 
front of the landowner's property and deprive him of lightf air 
and view. The Supreme Court held that Article 1 S 22 of the Utah 
Constitution had been carefully worded to include compensation 
for "damage" to property as well as "taking" of property; that 
wording was designed to "protect the damaged property owner 
equally with the property owner whose land was physically entered 
upon." Id. at 508. 
The Court reaffirmed all the principles enunciated in 
Stockdale and held that "a party, whose property is about to be 
specially damaged in any substantial degree for public use, has 
the same rights and is given the same remedies for the protection 
of his property from the threatened injury as would be accorded 
him if his property were actually taken and appropriated for such 
use." Id. at 506. 
E. Depriving an Owner of Beneficial Use of Property 
Constitutes a Compensable Taking. 
As recently as 1981, the Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed 
its position that deprivation of beneficial use is the standard 
by which to measure a taking. In Sweetwater Properties, SBC v. 
Town of Alta, 622 P.2d 1178, 1182 (Utah 1981) the court held that 
a policy declaration was not a taking because it did not deprive 
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the owner of r*e-f"*s benef^ial I.SP, lf follows that- if 
the government a, a^ - **•• ....,>. , f~ :r<\ 
nances, had de=r^*<?pd the owner ..,f beneticiai ub»- - - •• ^ n-
constituted 
II. UNDER FEDERAL LAW, ORDINANCE 81-1 ENTITLES DEFENDANTS 
TO COMPKN^iT o\j — OF THE DATE OF ENACTMENT 
The * . ** ^ enu] Amendment t o * ;ie -.t:- , • eu States ,_ .- i I i 
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.unance 81-1 Takes Defendants' Property 
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In
 Nollan v. California Loasta^ mmmissioi-
±^b ' } i cnpy of case -< -» i " • tJ- Supreme 
Court reiteio . - hp stance - '^i^'i 
States r "-rsr i Mit loi land use r p q u d t u n doe^ etie. 
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ests and _ •« -^ » not deny .* owner PCOJ- •• . -
i *i R^^.j^iie^^ T wnether j r, advances state :^fe:~^t^, 
viGi unce :; . . ; . .- i e - denies defendants any 
economica J 1 *. -'labie use ot t ne i i Land. 
tfj.» Court ais^ emphasized that the Takings 
Clause is designed • nyr government enf il ies hum fnrn <| some 
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people alone to bear public burdens that should be borne by the 
public as a whole, id. at 688 fn.4. 
B. Defendants Are Entitled to Damages for the 
Period 1981 to the Present. 
The United States Supreme Court has decided the very 
question that is before this Court. This Court must decide 
whether a landowner may recover damages from the time that the 
regulation constituted a taking of his property. The Supreme 
Court answered that question on June 9, 1987 in First English 
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 
96 L.Ed.2d 250, 258 (June 9, 1982) (copy of case, R. 464). The 
Court held that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments required com-
pensation for the period between the time the regulation took 
effect and the time the taking was officially acknowledged. 
The Lutheran Church owned a campground with bunkhouses 
and other buildings along a creek in the Angeles National Forest. 
Following a forest fire, a storm overflowed the banks of the 
creek, flooded the campground and destroyed the buildings. Los 
Angeles County responded to the flood by enacting Interim Ordi-
nance No. 11,855. The ordinance restricted all building within 
the flood protection area, which included part of the campground. 
The Lutheran Church argued that Ordinance 11,855 denied 
it all use of its campground. The Supreme Court, considering 
that argument, quoted the rule that property may be regulated to 
a certain extent, but if regulation goes too far, it will be 
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recognized as a taking even though there are no formal proceed-
ings. Id. at 264-65. The Court then held that "where the 
government's activities have already worked a taking of all use 
of property, no subsequent action by the government can relieve 
it of the duty to provide compensation for the period during 
which the taking was effective." Id. at 268. 
The Court recognized the far-reaching consequences of 
its decision. It wrote that its holding would lessen the freedom 
and flexibility of municipalities in enacting 
land-use-regulations, but that such consequences "necessarily 
flow from any decision upholding a claim of constitutional 
right." Id,. Defendants1 claim of Constitutional right requires 
that the general public pay the price of watershed protection by 
valuing the Rollers property on the day before Cornish passed an 
ordinance stripping the property of all value. A determination 
of the 1981 date of taking would substantially increase the fair 
market value of the property. Defendants were prohibited by 
order of the Court from presenting any evidence as to the ordi-
nances or the fair market value of the property prior to July 26, 
1986, the date of service of summons in this proceeding. 
IY 
WHETHER MINERAL RIGHTS ARE COMPENSABLE AS PART 
OF JUST COMPENSATION 
Plaintiff's Complaint, the Amended Complaint, the 
Motion for Immediate Occupancy and the proceeding and hearing for 
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immediate occupancy all required of defendants a taking of their 
property in fee simple. Even when plaintiff was specifically 
asked about a taking of all mineral rights prior to the Summons 
and Complaint and in the hearing for immediate occupancy, plain-
tiff responded, emphatically, that the taking in fee simple was 
absolutely necessary and that the taking in fee simple included 
all mineral rights to the property. The town's Ordinance 85-4 
authorizing condemnation required a taking in fee simple. 
The Order of Immediate Occupancy to the property 
required the taking the property in fee simple title including 
all mineral rights. Plaintiff having tendered to the Court 75% 
of the condemning authority's appraised valuation of the prop-
erty, left defendants with the only issue for consideration, 
defendants' "claim for greater compensation." (Section 78-34-9, 
U.C., 1987-88). 
Defendants prepared their defense and the evidence and 
expert testimony to sustain their burden of proof for greater 
compensation based upon the final amended complaint and Order of 
Occupancy each of which required the valuation of underlying min-
eral interests as part of the claim for title to the property in 
fee simple. 
After empanelment of the Jury and prior to opening 
statements defendants, as the party with the burden of proof, 
reviewed with the Court their intent to present to the jury in 
opening statement the issue of valuation of mineral rights. (Tr. 
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Vol* 1 at 1) Plaintiff immediately upon oral petition moved to 
amend its Complaint for the second time, to abandon and waive its 
claim for title to the property in fee simple and to make a new 
claim for condemnation pursuant to Section 78-34-2(1), U.C., 
1987-88. (Tr. Vol. 1 at 7) 
"The following is a classification of the estates 
and rights in lands subject to be taken for public use: 
(1) A fee simple when taken for . . . reservoirs 
and dams . . .; provided that where surface ground is 
underlaid with minerals, coal or other deposits suffi-
ciently valuable to justify extraction, only a perpet-
ual easement may be taken over the surface ground over 
such deposits. 
(2) An easement, when taken for any other purpose 
it 
. . . 
Plaintiff thereafter claimed a right to a "perpetual 
easement" only. The trial court allowed the abandonment of claim 
for fee simple interest in the property and permitted the amend-
ment of a claim for perpetual easement, over defendants1 objec-
tions and prohibited defendants from presenting to the jury the 
issue of valuation of mineral rights. (Tr. Vol. 1 at 77 and Vol. 
II at 11) The trial court further overruled defendants1 objec-
tions that pursuant to statute, plaintiff had amended its claim 
to an easement interest only and not a perpetual easement over 
the surface ground over such deposits. 
In State Dept. of Highways v. Wooley, 696 P.2d 828 
(Colo. 1984). The Colorado court held that the condemning 
authority must declare in its petition the nature of the taking 
-37-
so that the landowner can accurately evaluate the damages to be 
incurred. 
"The purpose of a taking of land and water rights by a 
city for water supply purposes fixes the extent of the 
rights reasonably necessary to exercise the title 
acquired. The government must commit itself as to what 
is taken and as to what remains untaken, and that which 
remains untaken continues vested in the owner." See 
also 30 C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 451. 
It has been held that where land is taken to protect a 
water supply from pollution, the condemnor is entitled to exclu-
sive possession of the land. Divided control over the land is 
incompatible with the taking of lands for a water supply. Barnes 
v. Peck, 187 N.E. 176, (Mass., 1933); Flaqq v. Concord, 111 N.E. 
369 (Mass., 1916). 
The taking of fee title is a taking of the entire title 
and necessarily includes all lesser estates including underlying 
minerals. 30 C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 450. Meriwether v. Gulf 
Oil Corp., 298 P.2d 758 (Okla. 1956). The fee simple title to 
the land acquired included all interests in the property and the 
land owner did not retain mineral rights in the property. 
In Springfield v. City of Perry, 358 P.2d 846 (Okla., 
1961), the city had condemned land for water works purposes. The 
Court held that condemnation proceedings resulted in acquisition 
of fee simple title to land including the mineral estate in view 
of the language of the pleadings. In Kansas Power & Light Co. v. 
Richie, 722 P.2d 1120 (Kan. App. 1986), the court held that if 
the intended use excludes rights of the underlying interest 
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holder, then value of mineral rights must be considered in deter-
mining just compensation. In Wymo Fuels, Inc. v. Edwards, 723 
P.2d 1230 (Wyo., 1986), the court held that the subservient 
estate retained only such incidents of ownership as were not 
inconsistent with plaintiff's dominent estate. Since plaintiff 
contends that the mining of minerals wold be inconsistent with 
their right to a protective zone, plaintiff must pay for the min-
eral interests underlying those protective zones. 
In Wm. E. Russell Coal Co. v. Board of County Commis-
sioners of Boulder County, 270 P.2d 772 (Colo. 1954), the land 
owner claimed coal interest underlying the property and that 
removal of those mineral interests would impair support of the 
surface easement acquired for a highway. Therefore, the land 
owner should be compensated for that underlying mineral interest. 
The Court held that the jury should determine the amount of dam-
age resulting to a land owner of mineral interests and the jury 
could not avoid determining the value of those mineral interests 
because the municipality had determined that the servitude estate 
was freed from liability because of a claim for surface rights 
only. 
IY 
WHETHER ABANDONMENT AT TRIAL OF PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR FEE 
SIMPLE GIVES RISE TO OBLIGATION TO PAY DEFENDANTS1 ATTORNEYS 
FEES, EXPENSES AND COSTS. 
State law specifically provides for an award of all 
damages, costs and attorney's fees to defendants as follows: 
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Condemnor . . . may, at any time prior to final 
payment . . . abandon the proceedings and cause the 
action to be dismissed without prejudice, provided, 
however, that as a condition of dismissal condemner 
first compensate condemnee for all damages he has sus-
tained and also reimburse him in full for all reason-
able and necessary expenses actually incurred by 
condemnee because of the filing of the action by 
condemner, including attorney's fees. 
(78-34-16, U.C., 1988-89) 
In April, 1984, by letter to Cornish Town, the town was 
advised by its engineer that the State Division of Health did not 
require that land be acquired as protection zone or that the land 
be owned by Cornish. (R. at 768) 
On March 17, 1986, Cornish Town wrote to Mr. Roller 
offering to purchase the property claimed to be necessary for 
protection of the town's water supply. 
On March 22, 1986, Mr. Roller responded to the inquiry 
asking the town to indicate the exact location and size of their 
proposed protection zone. And, specifically, Mr. Roller asked 
"How much control do you need over the areas in question? Do you 
need the oil and mineral rights?11 (R. at 778) 
On June 25, 1986, the town made no written response to 
the questions asked except an unsigned letter continuing an offer 
to purchase Mr. Roller's property. (R. at 782) 
On July 5, Mr. Roller responded in writing requesting 
the answers to his questions by asking review the matters with 
the town and its appraisers. He further advised the town of the 
issues raised in the Federal Farm Land Protection Act that 
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specifically deals with the interest in lands that are being 
acquired. (R. at 783) 
On July 14, 1986, Cornish Town made a "final offer to 
purchase" and stated "(7) In order for Cornish to maintain effec-
tive control over the spring protection zones, it is imperative 
that it obtain all rights to the land shown in the surveys." 
(Emphasis added) The letter further referred to the Utah Geolog-
ical & Mineral Survey which indicates the town was taking all 
rights including any underlying mineral deposits of whatever nat-
ure. (R. at 784) 
By Ordinance 85-4, the town authorized condemnation 
proceedings to acquire defendants' property in fee simple. 
In August, 1986, Cornish Town filed its Complaint for 
acquisition of this property by Cornish Town. In its Complaint 
and its First Amended Complaint in Condemnation, paragraph 7 
alleges "The Plaintiff seeks to acquire, in fee simple, all prop-
erty and property rights of the defendants in the real property 
described in Exhibit "A." (Emphasis added) 
On numerous occasions prior to hearing of Motion for 
Immediate Occupancy, the defendants requested that plaintiff 
recede from its demand for the taking of fee simple title to the 
property and on each occasion the request was denied. 
At the hearing for motion for immediate occupancy, the 
town was specifically asked on the record if they demanded fee 
simple to the land and the mineral rights (Hearing Tr. 469 & 
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Trial Tr. 787). the specific response was that the demand in 
condemnation was for all rights to the land, including mineral 
rights, otherwise the town would be frustrated in establishing 
its protection zones. 
"Mr. Preston: One other issue, and I don't know 
whether that's been addressed by the Court. Does the 
fee simple taking here exclude or include oil rights? 
"The Court: I don't know what their - I'd have to 
"Mr. Burnett: Fee simple is fee simple, and the 
whole purpose of the protection zones would be frus-
trated by having an oil rig on there. 
"The Court: Well, what does your resolution pro-
vide? Are you looking for surface rights? You're 
looking for fee simple surface rights, I know that. 
"Mr. Burnett: We are, your honor and I'd have to 
talk to our engineer and confirm that, because at this 
point as a lay person I'd be a little concerned about 
the purpose of the protection zone being frustrated by 
giving away some sub-surface rights which would inter-
fere with the whole purpose of the protection zone. I 
think that's an issue that could be addressed later on 
and not in an order of immediate occupancy. 
The Order of Immediate Occupancy provided for the tak-
ing of the land in fee simple. 
Defendants were then left with no further declaration 
or clarification as to the intent of the town other than the 
intent to demand and to acquire by condemnation the property in 
fee simple including all mineral rights. Defendants were then 
forced to prepare their claim for just compensation based upon 
the demands made by the town of Cornish for fee simple title to 
the property and for all rights and interests in the property 
including mineral rights. 
The laws of the State provide: 
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"The rights of just compensation for the land so 
taken or damaged shall vest in the parties entitled 
thereto, and said compensation shall be ascertained and 
awarded as provided in section 78-34-10 . . ." 
(78-34-9, U.C., '1988-89) 
Section 79-8-10 provides that: 
"The Court, jury or enforcee must hear such legal evi-
dence as may be offered by any of the parties to the 
proceedings, and thereupon must ascertain and assess: 
(1) The value of the property sought to be con-
demned, and all improvements thereon appertaining to 
the realty, and of each and every separate estate or 
interest therein . . . 
(5) As far as practicable, compensation must be 
assessed for each source of damages separately." 
(78-34-10, U.C., 'Sa^) (Emphasis added) 
Defendants prepared their claims for damages and just 
compensation to include the mineral rights taken and were pre-
pared to present those claims at trial. 
Defendants advised plaintiff that their mineral experts 
would testify including Don Curry, Mineral Engineer, Pete Bunger, 
Mineral Chemist and mineral broker and rebuttal witness Ken 
Santini, Mineral Engineer, as needed. 
A proffer of proof was made to the Court prior to open-
ing arguments as to the issue of mineral rights and the values to 
the underlying minerals included in the taking were valued in 
amounts exceeding $38 million dollars. Defendants also proffered 
that removal of the minerals would not support the overlying sur-
face rights claimed by plaintiff. 
On February 9, 1988, plaintiff, for the first time, 
decided that the town ws bound by Utah statutes and therefore 
-43-
plaintiff determined that Section 78-34-2, U.C., '88-89, did not 
allow them to take fee simple to the Roller land and so plaintiff 
orally petitioned the Court for leave to amend its Complaint a 
second time and to allow the town of Cornish to abandon its claim 
for mineral rights, to abandon its claim for fee simple and peti-
tioned that the town be allowed to amend its Complaint to provide 
that a taking be a perpetual easement only. The Court granted 
that motion. (Tr. Vol. I at 10 and Vol. II at 15) 
The town of Cornish in its own proposed Judgment of 
Special Verdict admits to the abandonment of its claim to mineral 
rights. 
On February 9, 1988, plaintiff moved to amend its Com-
plaint to request that a perpetual easement rather than 
a fee simple may be taken over the surface ground of 
the areas being acquired as protection zones, reservoir 
and pump house sites and the non-tillable or dry 
grazing-sidehill area above the pipeline as more fully 
described in the amended complaint." (Emphasis added) 
The town admitted that the motion for leave to amend to abandon 
its claim for fee simple was made specifically because of defen-
dants1 claim that the mineral rights were commercially valuable 
and the town could not afford to purchase those mineral rights. 
Defendants submitted their Affidavit of Fees, Expenses 
and Costs incurred in preparation for the issue of value of min-
eral rights including legal fees of $16,840.40, costs advanced of 
$1,551.27 (R. 835) and expenses of $19,747.61 (R. at 759). 
This Court has considered and upheld the statutory 
right of defendants to attorney's fees and costs when a condemnor 
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abandons its claims in condemnation in Provo City Corp. v. Crop-
per, 497 P.2d 629 (Utah, 1972), In this case, the condemning 
authority advised the Court in pre-trial that it intended to 
withdraw its claim and dismiss its action and that defendant's 
property was no longer needed for public use. Because of 
plaintiff's representations, the case was stricken from the trial 
calendar. The Supreme Court held that plaintiff had abandoned 
its claims and that defendant had a right to recover fees and 
costs. No matter the fact that the claim was still of record and 
had not been formally dismissed. 
In the present action, plaintiff amended its Complaint 
and abandoned its claim for fee simple title to the property and 
abandoned the claim for mineral rights. This Court has long held 
that an amended complaint is a dismissal of claims and abandon-
ment of claims in the complaint that are not raised in the 
amended complaint. 
"The law is overwhelming to the effect that when 
an amended complaint, complete in and of itself is 
filed, the former complaint is functus officio and can-
not be used for any purpose." 
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers Local Union 222 
v. Motor Cargo, 530 P.2d 807 (1974). 
When the claimant files an amended complaint, the 
amendment abandons the former cause of action. The original 
pleading is considered abandoned and ceases to perform any func-
tion. A claim raised in the Complaint and not raised in the 
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Amended Complaint is therefore dismissed. Fluke Capital & Man-
agement Service Co. v. Richmond, 724 P.2d 356 (Wash., 1986). 
The proceedings in this action were to obtain fee sim-
ple title. The action for fee simple title was abandoned by 
amending the Complaint after the Jury was selected, and that 
claim or action was dismissed by order of the Court that plain-
tiff could amend its Complaint after the commencement of trial to 
assert a claim for perpetual easement only. At the entry of an 
Order of Immediate Occupancy, plaintiff knew that the defendants 
were required to defend and carry the burden of proof of defen-
dants' claim of greater value than the value indicted by 
plaintiff s appraiser. 
The abandonment and dismissal of their claim for fee 
simple title to the property should give rise to the statutory 
award to defendants of costs, expenses and attorney's fees. The 
Court denied the claim for fees and costs. (R. at 859) 
These issues are exhaustingly treated in Annotation 92 
A.L.R.2d 355 and 68 A.L.R.3d 610 (copy of annotation, R. at 870). 
The fact that plaintiff abandoned only part of its 
claim has been considered by a number of jurisdictions and each 
of those courts have held that partial abandonment gives rise to 
liability for attorney's fees, costs and expenses incurred as to 
the portion of the claims that have been abandoned. Akana v. 
Felix, 261 F.2d 773 (9th Cir. Hawaii, 1958); Dept. of Public 
Works v. Lauter, 153 N.E.2d 552 (111., 1958). 
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People by Dept. of Transportation v. Northern Trust 
Co., 376-M.E.2d 286 (111. App., 1978); Independent School Dis-
trict v. Gross, 190 N.W.2d 651 (Minn., 1973); State Dept. of Nat-
ural Resources v. Sellers, 237 N.E.2d 328 (Ohio, 1979); Atherton 
v. State Conservation Commission, 203 N.W.2d 620 (Iowa, 1978). 
The identical issues to the case at bar were considered 
in Merced Irrigation Dist. v. Woolstenhulme, 483 P.2d 1 (Calif., 
1971) (Copy of case, R. 846). In the initial complaint, the 
irrigation district sought to condemn a fee interest in property 
parcels designated 1, 2, 4 and 5 and the cattle grazing and 
watering rights to 199.9 acres of land designated as parcel 3. 
The district filed an amended complaint seeking a complete fee 
interest in 117 acres in parcel 3 and dropped the demand for 
grazing and water rights. The amended complaint excluded the 
claim for parcels 4 and 5 completely. The trial court held that 
the amended complaint constituted a partial abandonment and the 
Supreme Court upheld that determination. 
The California statute is the same requirement as the 
Utah statute. It is designed to compensate a defendant for 
expenses incurred in anticipation of an eminent domain proceed-
ing, when the condemner declines to carry the proceeding through 
to its conclusion. When plaintiff amended its complaint, it 
abandoned its efforts to acquire 82.9 acres in fee simple, and 
attorneys' fees and costs should be awarded based upon the costs 
incurred by defendants allocated to that portion of the 
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proceeding. A California case identical to the case at bar is 
County of Kern v. Galatas, 200 Cal.App.2d 353f 19 Cal.Rept. 348 
(Cal.App., 1962) (copy of case R. 865). The county abandoned its 
claim for mineral rights and amended its complaint to take land 
only and not the mineral rights by condemnation. The court held 
that defendant land owners were entitled to legal fees and costs 
incurred as to the abandoned claims to condemn mineral rights. 
The town demanded the right to condemn fee simple title 
under section 78-34-1, U.C., f87-88, for a public use. The 
determination of what is a public use is a judicial determina-
tion, not just a legislative assertion, but a determination that 
the fee simple title demanded was in fact a public use for which 
the town had a right to condemn defendants1 property (see Pordova 
v. City of Tucson, 494 P.2d 52 (Ariz. App., 1972). 
The town determined that fee simple title was necessary 
for protection and preservation for part of the town's water sup-
ply. Such a determination is claimed to be a public use for 
proper exercise of the power of eminent domain. City of Tacoma 
v. Welcher, 399 P.2d 330 (Wash., 1965). 
The clear intent of the town in its claims was to 
obtain fee simple title and such is presumed by statute when the 
taking was for a public use and was the intent expressed in the 
demand for taking. Olsen v. Board of Education, 571 P.2d 1336 
(Utah, 1977). 
-48-
In Elliott v. City of Guthrie, 725 P.2d 861 (Okla., 
1986), the Court held that when fee simple title was reasonably 
necessary or requisite to the designated public use, and that 
concurrent use of other interest owners of land was not desirable 
because of the necessity of protecting the purity of the water 
supply, then the designated fee simple title for public use would 
take precedence over the mere easement right designated for 
rights-of-way by the statute. 
The town represented that a quantum of less than fee 
simple would frustrate and destroy its intended use that being 
the claim, the legislature intended the appropriation of the fee 
"for all other public uses for the benefit of the . . . town." 
78-34-1, U.C., '87-88. Section 78-34-2 does not mandate a lesser 
estate but classifies the estate or quantum to be taken unless 
the condemning authority requires a greater estate for its 
declared public purpose. The Court foreclosed the provisions as 
to the quantum of the estate or the public need and necessity 
with its Order of Immediate Occupancy, leaving the defendants 
with the burden of proving the value of their mineral interests 
and the value of the land taken in fee simple. 
V 
WHETHER DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO SUBMIT EVIDENCE OF THE 
VALUE OF PROSPECTIVE BUSINESS VENTURE IN THE PROPERTY. 
Defendants were prohibited from putting evidence to the 
jury as to the retail value of hunting access permits to hunt 
-49-
deer on defendants1 property. (Jury Instruction No. 28,R. 739, 
Tr. Vol. I, at 80 & Vol. II at 91) 
The loss of business potential may be introduced in 
evidence to show a diminution of the highest and best use for the 
property, not for the purpose of showing loss of profits or 
income. State ex rel Herman v. Schaffer, 467 P.2d 66 (Ariz., 
1970). That was the specific reason for offering that evidence. 
(Tr. at 86) The loss of that business opportunity should be sub-
mitted to the jury just as the loss of grazing access was held to 
be a proper claim for determining severance damages in State By 
and Through Road Commission v. Larkin, 495 P.2d 817 (Utah, 1972). 
The evidence that should be presented to the jury should be any 
evidence which will aid the jury in fixing the fair market value 
of the property. It should not be merely speculation, but evi-
dence which would be considered by a prospective vendor or pur-
chaser or which would tend to enhance or appreciate the value of 
the property taken. State v. Kunimoto, 617 P.2d 913 (Hawaii, 
1980). 
The future use for sale of hunting access permits is 
reasonable evidence for probable future use, and competent evi-
dence which would tend to show the value of that use should have 
been admitted. State By Attorney General v. Pioneer Mill Co., 
637 P.2d 1131 (Hawaii, 1981). Evidence to show that certain 
income producing use at the time of condemnation was reasonably 
probable is admissible, and expert testimony as to a legitimate 
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income stream from that future use should be admissible. City & 
County of Honolulu v. International Air Service Co., Inc., 628 
F.2d 192 (Hawaii, 1981), and State Dept. of Highways v. Mahaffey, 
697 P.2d 773 (Colo. App., 1984). 
VI 
WHETHER DEFENDANTS1 COSTS AWARDED SHOULD INCLUDE THE 
COSTS OF PREPARATION AND PRESENTATION OF TRANSCRIPTS 
AND EXHIBITS USED IN TRIAL. 
Defendants petitioned an award of costs totalling 
$2,252.65 (R. 833). Costs are generally allocable only in the 
amount and in the manner provided by Statute. The trial court 
has the discretion in regard to the allowance of costs and has 
the duty to guard against any excesses or abuses in the taxing of 
costs. Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771 (Utah, 1980). 
Rule 54(4)(1): 
"Costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing 
party unless the court otherwise directs. . . . " 
The trial court may exercise reasonable discretion in regard to 
the allowance of costs. Costs are taxable in condemnation cases. 
Sigurd City v.State, 142 P.2d 154 (Utah, 1943). 
Costs means those fees which are required to be paid to 
the Court and to witnesses. The Court approves the costs of dep-
ositions as the taxing of costs and the costs of transcripts of 
record should be equal thereto. The same is also true in the 
taxing of costs on appeal for the costs of the transcript of rec-
ord. The exhibits produced by defendants are necessarily 
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required in condemnation proceedings when the property is not 
personally viewed by the jury and the jury must visualize the 
property through photographs and graphic exhibits. Extraordinary 
as these costs and expenses are, they are unique to the defen-
dants1 burden of proving greater value, they are required because 
of plaintiff's statutory right of condemnation, and should be 
taxable as costs herein. 
CONCLUSION 
1. Defendants have a right to have the issue of public 
need and necessity determined by the jury. 
2. The appropriate and proper date of taking was the 
regulatory taking by town Ordinance 81-1 in September, 1981. 
3. The Court's permitting amendment of Complaint and 
prohibiting defendants from submitting the value of the underly-
ing mineral rights to the jury should be reversed or remanded for 
determination of the value of the mineral rights taken. 
4. Defendants have a right to an award of costs, 
expenses and attorney's fees incurred after demand for title in 
fee simple was abandoned by plaintiff. 
5. The defendants should be permitted to submit the 
evidence of value of access permits for hunting to determine the 
value of the highest and best use of the property. 
6. Defendants have a right to be awarded costs 
incurred for photographs, graphic exhibits and transcripts of 
preliminary hearings as a proper taxing of costs herein. 
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THEREFORE, the decision of the trial court should be 
reversed and and the matters remanded for trial and further 
determination consistent with this Court's determinations. 
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